Home reports armed forces Balance sheet of the Ukrainian counteroffensive

Balance sheet of the Ukrainian counteroffensive

Alex Horobets

November 29, 2023

This spring, Ukraine launched a counteroffensive in the south of the country with the aim of reaching the coast of the Sea of Azov and cutting the land corridor in southeastern Ukraine that connects mainland Russia with occupied Crimea. In the run-up to the operation, there was speculation in the media about when the operation would begin. In addition, many expected a rapid advance like that which took place when large areas near Kharkiv and on the right bank of the Dnipro in southern Ukraine were liberated in 2022. These expectations resulted from the training of Ukrainian soldiers and the delivery of Western-made armored vehicles. In June 2023, the first reports emerged of increased fighting on the Southern Front, which many interpreted as a sign that the counteroffensive had begun.

However, there was no lightning breakthrough of the Russian defensive lines as Ukraine's offensive efforts dragged on. This led to widespread criticism of the push, which was slower than many expected. Russian propaganda did not miss this opportunity and immediately seized on the wave, spreading unconfirmed claims about Ukrainian losses in tanks and personnel.

Causes of the slow advance

In contrast, many experts did not have overly optimistic expectations of the counteroffensive, as they were aware of the complexity of the situation. Finally, in the southern part of Ukraine, where the main strike was expected, the Russian military had enough time to entrench itself, as Ukraine had to wait for the delivery of the necessary weapons and training of troops.

Hopes for a quick counteroffensive were also fueled by Western partners training Ukrainian forces and providing them with military equipment, including heavy armored vehicles. The tanks supplied by the partners surpassed the Soviet models in many respects, including ease of maintenance, ease of use and crew survivability. This was already evident in the first weeks of the offensive operations. However, the dense minefields and sophisticated network of trenches and barriers prevented the Ukrainians from taking full advantage of Western technology.

In addition, the Ukrainian commanders were very careful in their attacks on the Russian defense lines to protect the lives of their own soldiers, knowing Russia's superiority in personnel reserves.

Another reason for the slow advance is the lack of air superiority. Since the offensive began, Russian forces have used guided bombs, cluster bombs and helicopter gunships, particularly in the south. Ukraine was forced to conserve its aircraft fleet and not allow them to get too close to the front lines given the limited capabilities of Soviet-era fighter aircraft. Western doctrine, however, assumes the constant use of aircraft to support ground forces, as was the case in Iraq.

Given that the heavy tanks provided by Western partners were also rather limited, Ukrainian commanders decided that sending these tanks directly to the front was too risky. Therefore, just a few weeks after the start of offensive operations, the Ukrainian military adjusted its strategy to minimize its own losses while further weakening Russian troops through artillery and long-range missile strikes.

Dependent on Western support

Based on these considerations, recent events on the Zaporizhzhia front give cause for cautious optimism. At the same time, it is clear that the Russians are doing everything they can to hold their positions. Success by Ukrainian forces in these areas will further question the implementation of the original objectives of Russia's so-called "special military operation" in Ukraine.

In the meantime, the Kremlin is working to legitimize the occupation regime in the occupied territories. Mock elections were also held. If cities like Tokmak were to be besieged or even recaptured by Ukraine, it would be a serious blow to Moscow's reputation, because the only city that Russia was able to take during the offensive between winter 2022 and spring 2023 was Bakhmut in the Donetsk region.

It is also important to note that it is unclear how strong Russia's reserves are in the southern operational zone. The main defense forces have been concentrated in the areas of the Ukrainian offensive. This raises the question of whether Russian forces will be able to maintain defense if the Ukrainians break through the main defensive line. In addition, after Ukraine received Storm Shadow and SCALP cruise missiles, Russian high-value targets were attacked relatively frequently.

Although optimism for the Ukrainian counteroffensive has waned for now, its success would not mean ultimate victory. First, the outcome of the effort remains unclear. Second, statements from Russian officials indicate that Moscow will not stop its military action, at least not this winter and next spring. However, this position could change if Russian forces are unable to defend the areas they currently occupy and withdraw. This scenario could accelerate if Western partners provide Ukraine with ATACMS tactical ballistic missiles and F-16 fighter jets, as they have announced. Fortunately, Ukraine's allies have indicated that they understand the importance of these arms shipments to Ukraine's war effort.

Alex Horobets

Causes of the slow advance

Dependent on Western support

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